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Abstract
This paper, based on personal interviews, analysis of Egyp-
tian administrative regulations, and observation of prac-
tice of international and regional agreements on refugees,
considers the effects of displacement on the Palestinians’
legal status and hence on the way they have conducted
their livelihoods in Egypt. While Arab countries have of-
fered to provide temporary protection to Palestinian refu-
gees, as a result of political developments, including
relations between the PLO and the host states, the rights
afforded to Palestinians in Arab host states have varied
greatly over time.
Palestinians in Egypt, since 1978, do not receive assis-
tance from the government of Egypt and do not have access to
any of its public services. Palestinians also do not receive any
assistance or protection from UN bodies in charge of refugee
issues. Both regional and international pledges and agree-
ments have not been respected. The ambiguous legal status of
Palestinians has affected their livelihoods in many ways. It has
rendered their residence insecure and in many cases illegal.
This has affected employment and education opportunities, as
well as freedom of movement and association. The deprivation
of rights and the unstable legal and economic conditions of
Palestinians in Egypt has placed them in a state of “limbo.”
Résumé
Cet article est fondé sur des interviews personnelles, sur
une analyse des règlements administratives égyptiennes
et sur une observation de la manière dont le droit inter-
national et les accords régionaux sur les réfugiés sont mis
en pratique, et examine l’effet qu’a eu le déplacement sur
le statut légal des Palestiniens et, par conséquent, sur la
façon dont ils ont pu mener et gagner leur vie en Égypte.
S’il est vrai que les pays arabes ont offert de fournir une
protection temporaire aux réfugiés palestiniens, à cause
des développements politiques, y compris les relations de
l’OLP avec les pays d’accueil, les droits concédés aux Pa-
lestiniens dans les pays hôtes arabes ont varié grande-
ment au cours des années.
Depuis 1978, les Palestiniens qui se trouvent en
Égypte ne reçoivent plus d’assistance du gouvernement
égyptien et n’ont pas accès aux services publics. En plus,
les Palestiniens ne reçoivent aucune assistance ou de pro-
tection des organismes onusiens en charge des questions
des réfugiés. Les promesses et les accords, tant régionaux
qu’internationaux, n’ont pas été respectés. L’ambiguïté
du statut légal des Palestiniens a affecté leur capacité de
gagner leur vie de diverses façons. Elle a rendue leur rési-
dence précaire, souvent même illégale. Cela a affecté leur
possibilité de trouver de l’emploi et d’avoir accès à l’édu-
cation, ainsi que leur capacité de se déplacer et de s’orga-
niser librement en groupe associatifs. Privés de droits et
légalement et économiquement en situation précaire, les
Palestiniens d’Égypte se retrouvent dans un état indéter-
miné.
B
ased on reports of massacres, evidence of villages and
towns being cleared of their populations, and a well-
founded fear of further persecution from Zionist
guerrilla troops and later the Israeli Defence Forces, Pales-
tinians fled their homes in Palestine in 1948 and in 1967 to
seek shelter in neighbouring countries.
Much has been written on the causes of their flight and
on their living conditions in what are known as “host
countries.”1 Little, however, has been written about those
who fled to Egypt, numbering 13,000 in 1948 and 33,000 in
1969.2 This paper is based on research which was conducted
over two years (2001–2003) under the auspices of the
Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme (FMRS)
of the American University in Cairo (AUC). This paper,
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based on personal interviews with eighty Palestinian fami-
lies (401 persons), considers the effects of displacement on
their legal status and hence on the way they conducted their
livelihoods in Egypt. Several factors affected their adjust-
ment to the new environment – the personal resources they
had to “reconstruct” in their lives and the attitude of the
host country itself to them and their legal status.
This research approached the “field” from a descriptive
perspective  based  on  a  qualitative case-study approach.
Statistical sampling and quantitative data collection would
not have been possible given the fact that the exact number
of Palestinian refugees in Egypt is not known and the results
of the census conducted by the government in 1995 are not
available. A snowball method was used in reaching Pales-
tinians dispersed all over the governorates of Egypt. When
arriving in the area, the research team would ask a shop-
keeper for a Palestinian resident. After finding the first
Palestinian household, it would then make referrals to
other households. The research team used an open-ended
questionnaire which permitted Palestinians to elaborate on
their answers and to clarify their coping strategies in Egypt.
Research into Palestinians in Egypt has the aim of pro-
viding an understanding of the difficulties they face and
laying the foundation for possible projects or actions to
benefit this community since it is neither protected nor
assisted by any United Nations body. Until Palestinians can
return to Palestine, these endeavours are intended to ensure
them a decent life while they  remain outside Palestine.
Assistance efforts being considered include income-genera-
tion and educational skills training projects. Calling for an
amelioration of Palestinians’  living  conditions in Egypt
does not mean denying their right of return. On the con-
trary, the objective is to ensure their socio-economic rights
and an acceptable legal status, wherever they are residing,
meanwhile supporting their legal and political right to re-
turn to their homeland.
Why Did Palestinians Go to Egypt?
Palestinians went  to Egypt either fearing  persecution in
Palestine or for socio-economic reasons and were denied
access to Palestine as a result of occupation. The first cate-
gory includes 1948 arrivals who are “Palestinian refugees”
as well as those who fled to Egypt as a result of the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the so called
“displaced Palestinians.” The second category consists of
those who were outside Palestine during the 1956 and 1967
wars and would not return to their homes and properties.
This category includes those who sought employment and
educational opportunities in Egypt between 1954 and 1967
but as a result of the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, many of them could not return to Palestine and
have had to remain in Egypt.
Refugees and Displaced Persons
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
defines a “Palestine refugee” as “any person whose normal
place of residence was Palestine during the period June 1,
1946 to May 15, 1948 and who lost both home and means
of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” This definition
was made solely to enable UNRWA to determine eligibility
for the agency’s assistance programs in its five field opera-
tions: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordan.3
Of Palestinians who sought refuge in Egypt, some lived
temporarily in Gaza and registered with UNRWA, while
others went directly from their homes in Palestine to Egypt
so could not register with UNRWA. The majority of Pales-
tinians in Egypt are from the latter group. Egypt’s Depart-
ment of Nationality and Passports had its own definition of
them for the purposes of accommodating them in tempo-
rary refugee camps and providing relief through the Egyp-
tian Higher Committee for Palestinian Immigrants.
“Palestinian immigrants” were defined as those persons
who sought refuge in Egypt from 1948 to 1950.4
During the 1967 War, more Palestinians, most of them
registered with UNRWA, fled from Gaza to Jordan and then
Egypt. This displacement included two groups: “refugees-
displaced” and “displaced” coming from Gaza.5 The “refu-
gees-displaced” had been forced to flee Palestine for the
second time, the first time being when they left their homes
in Palestine for Gaza and the second time being when they
left the territories occupied in 1967, which included Gaza.
The “displaced” are original inhabitants of Gaza who were
displaced for the first time by the 1967 War. Despite the fact
that some were registered with UNRWA, those who arrived
in Egypt did not receive assistance from any United Nations
(UN) agency.6 The Egyptian Administrative Office of the
Governor of Gaza, initially based in Gaza and later moved
to Cairo, was the only administrative body dealing with
Palestinians in Egypt. The office is still in existence.
Socio-Economic Displacement
After the Rhodes Armistice was signed in February of 1949
on the Greek island of Rhodes, Egypt assumed military and
administrative control of Gaza.7 In 1954, when Gamal Ab-
del-Nasser became president, work in trade, industry, and
transport between Gaza and Egypt was permitted.8 At the
outbreak of the 1967 War, Palestinians who had been in-
volved in these activities settled in Egypt because of the social
and professional networks they had established there.
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In 1962, economic conditions in Gaza were deteriorating
and unemployment increased. In response, Nasser called
for Palestinians from Gaza with high school diplomas or
college degrees to apply to work in public institutions in
Egypt and regulations were issued to facilitate their employ-
ment. Those who responded were unable to return to Gaza
when the 1967 War erupted and Israelis occupied Gaza. In
addition, many Palestinians, as interviews revealed, sought
education in prominent Egyptian universities. Again, due
to the 1967 War, they were unable to return to Gaza. Other
Palestinians went to Egypt as part of Red Cross efforts to
reunite families that had been living in Gaza and whose
relatives lived in Egypt.
Socio-Economic Conditions Changed
The policies implemented by Nasser beginning in 1954
welcomed Palestinians and treated them as if they were
Egyptian nationals. Palestinians were able to enhance their
livelihoods during this era and to access state services. Work
was permitted and education, including university level was
free. Most important, the administrative laws were amended
so that the word “foreign” no longer applied to Palestinians.
Political events in the late 1970s marked the end of the
golden era for Palestinians in Egypt. The Camp David peace
accords and the killing of the Egyptian Minister of Culture
Youssef al-Sibai in 1978 by a Palestinian faction group of
Abu Nidal al-Banna had a negative impact on Egyptian
policy toward Palestinians in Egypt. Laws and regulations
were amended to  treat Palestinians as  foreigners. Their
rights to free education, employment, and even residency
were taken away from them. University education now has
to be paid for in foreign currency. For example, according
to a study conducted by Yassin from 1965 to 1978, Pales-
tinian students studying at universities had numbered
20,000, but by 1985 the number had dropped to 4,500.
Those  enrolled  in public universities between the years
1997–1998 and 2000–2001 were 3,048.9
Those who had established themselves earlier in the
public and the private sector were able to remain in their
positions. Government employees or professionals, such as
doctors and lawyers, kept their posts. No new Palestinians
were hired by the state, however. With access to govern-
ment jobs gone, they are left with the private sector and the
informal economy. The private sector requires skills,
which, without education, Palestinians are unable to ob-
tain. It also requires work permits, considering that, in
Egypt, the number of foreigners may not exceed 10 per cent
of the workforce in each workplace. Palestinians are forced
to find work in such sectors as driving trucks and taxis for
others, bicycle repair shops, petty trade in commodities
such as used clothing on the street, and suitcase merchants
who take items from various parts of Egypt to sell in Gaza
but now even this trade has stopped because of the second
Intifada.
The situation is better for the employees of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestine Liberation
Army, and current and former Egyptian government em-
ployees. They are ensured regular income, and, later, a
regular pension. In addition to the education of their chil-
dren, they are exempted from 90 per cent of university fees.
While socio-economic conditions brought some Pales-
tinians to Egypt, war prevented them from returning home.
In September 2002, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reinterpreted Article 1D of
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.10
UNHCR had previously viewed the article as excluding
Palestinian refugees because they receive assistance from
UNRWA; it now emphasized the second paragraph, which
clarifies that Palestinian refugees are ipso facto refugees and
are to be protected by UNHCR if assistance or protection
of another UN body ceases.11 By this action, it has included
Palestinians, particularly those not living within UNRWA
fields of operation, within its protection mandate. The fact
that these Palestinians are in dire need of protection is
reflected in the numbers of young Palestinian men who are
detained in Egyptian prisons indefinitely because they lack
residence permits. Their choices are limited – find a country
that will take them in or find a way of being deported to
Gaza. But given the current Intifada and as Israel has the
final decision on permitting entry, getting to Gaza has been
impossible. Despite the recent reinterpretation of the Refu-
gee Convention, Palestinians in Egypt still lack formal
UNHCR protection and they are not assisted by UNRWA.
The paper highlights the urgent need for international in-
tervention to better protect the legal rights of Palestinians.
Until there is a Palestinian state and Palestinians are able to go
there, the Egyptian government should reconsider its policies
on Palestinians and try to provide basic services for them.
Legal Rights of Palestinians in Egypt
Arab host states responded to the plight of displaced Pales-
tinians by offering them temporary protection until they
could return to Palestine. However, as a result of political
developments, including relations between the PLO and the
host states, the rights afforded to Palestinians in Arab host
states have varied greatly over time. While the previous
sections  discussed the effects of changing administrative
policies on the daily livelihood of Palestinians in Egypt, this
part examines the legal status granted to Palestinians in
Egypt.
As a result of their legal difficulties in Egypt, many Pal-
estinians sought a way out. The establishment of the Pales-
Palestinian Refugees of Egypt
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tinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank revived hopes
of returning to Palestine. For many, return to the homeland
meant the materialization of a dream of reconstructing
broken family ties and ties to the land, but most impor-
tantly, it meant securing legal status in a place where they
belong. However, due to the Intifada and the continued
occupation of the Palestinian territories and as a result of
the international conventions and Arab league protocols
that were not respected by Egypt, Palestinians’ legal status
is today “in limbo.”
Legal Status
For the purpose of granting assistance in Egypt, the Egyptian
Higher Committee for Palestinian Immigrants defined Pal-
estinian refugees as persons who sought refuge in the coun-
try from 1948 to 1950. To prove this, a person was required
to have an identity card for temporary residence in Egypt
issued by the Egyptian Department of Passports and Nation-
ality. A ministerial decision was promulgated to allow issu-
ing of the temporary residence identity documents (IDs) for
Palestinian refugees. The decision stipulated that the IDs
should not be renewed for more than one year and should
indicate the material assistance that its holders were receiv-
ing. Meanwhile, the Government of All Palestine (GAP),12 a
civil administrative government, moved its offices to Egypt
in late 1948 and began issuing Palestinians with travel docu-
ments and birth certificates. Holders of GAP passports were
granted one-year residence permits in Egypt but were not
permitted to work. Written directly on the document were
the words “work for or without wages is forbidden,”13 GAP
papers and passports were largely symbolic, as was GAP
itself.
In 1960, during the brief period of unity between Egypt
and Syria, Decision No. 28 was issued stipulating the pro-
vision of travel documents for Palestinians. In order to
receive such a document, a Palestinian had to prove refugee
status by producing the ID issued earlier by the Egyptian
Department of Passports and Nationality and also had to
prove legal residence in Egypt. Article 2 prohibited the
holder of the travel document from travelling between the
northern (Syrian) and the southern (Egyptian) regions
without having a visa as well as a return visa. Meanwhile,
Egypt reassured Palestinians residing in its territories that
they would not lose their Palestinian nationality. Interior
Minister Zakaryia Muhi El-Din sent instructions to the
Department of Immigration and Passports and Nationality
emphasizing the need for the preservation of Palestinian
nationality for Palestinians residents of the United Arab
Republic (UAR) because they will return to their original
homeland after its liberation.14
In 1964, Decision 181 was issued. Article 1 said that
Palestinian refugees should be given temporary travel
documents upon request but required applicants to provide
proof of refugee status and have a valid Egyptian residence
permit. Article 4 stated that the travel document would be
valid for two years and could be extended for another two
years, followed by one additional year for a maximum
validity of five years. Article 5 stipulated that the travel
document did not permit its holders to enter or transit
through Egypt without a visa, transit visa, or return visa.
On September 11, 1965, Egyptian Foreign Minister
Mahmoud Riyad ratified the protocol on the treatment of
Palestinians in Arab states. While confirming the preserva-
tion of Palestinian nationality, the Arab states agreed to
grant Palestinians living in host countries the right to work
and be employed as nationals and the right to leave and
return to the host country freely, and agreed to grant them
valid travel documents upon request.15
Arab Government Policies
The League of Arab States resolutions on Palestinian refu-
gees indicate the member states’ commitment to finding a
solution to the Palestinian plight by “ensuring their return
to their homes and confirming preservation of their prop-
erties, their money, their life and their freedom,” as stated
in Resolution 205-17-3-1949. Concerning the treatment of
Palestinian refugees, Resolution 391-10-1951 states,
The Council of the League approves the decision of the political
committee with reference to the decision of the Palestinian
permanent council to discuss all refugees’ affairs thoroughly
and to consider their need to work, to travel and to remain in
the host countries. The council requires the committee to pre-
pare a financial report on the needs for Palestinian refugees.
In 1952, the Arab League established the Administrative
Office of Palestine. It has two sections: political and legal
matters and refugee affairs. In addition, the political com-
mittee of the Council of the Arab League dealt with Pales-
tinian refugee matters by approving a number of
resolutions. Resolution 424-4-9-1952 stipulated that uni-
fied travel documents were to be issued to dispersed Pales-
tinian families. This was later ratified when the Council
decided to approve the issuing of unified travel documents
to Palestinian refugees in Resolution 714-27-1-1954. Arti-
cle 1 of this resolution stated,
The governments of state members at the League have agreed
that each government should issue the Palestinian refugees
residing in its territory, or falling under its care, temporary
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travel documents upon their request and in accordance with the
provisions of the following articles unless they have obtained
citizenship from one of the states.”
In Resolution 462-23-9-1952, Article 1, the political
committee advised Arab governments to postpone efforts
to settle Palestinian refugees and called on the United Na-
tions to implement resolutions concerning the return of
Palestinian refugees to Palestine and to compensate them
for damage and property losses. In Article 2, it recom-
mended that Arab countries hosting refugees create pro-
jects employing Palestinians and help them better their
living conditions. While requesting Arab countries to co-
ordinate with UNRWA in employment projects for Pales-
tinians, the political committee confirmed that these
projects would not permanently settle Palestinians and
would preserve their right of return and right to compen-
sation. In Article 3, the committee required Arab govern-
ments to co-ordinate efforts facilitating the travel of
Palestinians and to co-operate for their temporary stay in
host countries. The Arab League efforts culminated in 1965
with the adoption of the Casablanca Protocol on the Treat-
ment of Palestinians.
The Arab League’s Casablanca Protocol called on Arab
governments to grant Palestinians residence permits, the
right to work, and the right to travel on a par with citizens
while at the same  time  emphasizing the  importance of
preserving Palestinian identity and maintaining the refugee
status of Palestinians residing in host countries. At least on
paper, the members of the Arab League expressed their
solidarity with and sympathy for Palestinians and their
rights. However, in practice, the Casablanca Protocol was
ignored.
Realizing that the rights referred to in the protocol were
not always being upheld in Arab host states and in view of
the various problems facing Palestinian refugees, in De-
cember 1982 the Arab League called a meeting of the Coun-
cil of Arab Ministers of the Interior, which adopted a
“special resolution on the treatment of Palestinians in the
Arab countries.” Its operative paragraphs contain a number
of important clarifications on the status of Palestinians in
Arab League member states.
Paragraph 1 stipulated that the travel documents issued
for Palestinians by any Arab country should be granted on
an equal basis with the national passports issued to its own
citizens. Paragraph 2 stated that bearers of such documents
“shall be accorded the same treatment as nationals of the
state issuing this document, as regards freedom of resi-
dence, work and movement.” In addition, “special meas-
ures needed for the implementation” of the first two
paragraphs were to be co-ordinated with the PLO. Lastly,
Paragraph 4 contained a provision that had not been in-
cluded in the Casablanca Protocol nor in  any previous
resolution: “If a Palestinian perpetrates a crime in any Arab
country, the laws of the country of his residence will be
applicable.”16
The Arab League Secretariat was keen to monitor the
problems experienced by Palestinians in host countries and
the extent to which the protocol had been implemented.
Because of Palestinian support for Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the treatment of
Palestinians in Arab countries worsened. The 46th session
of the Conference of Supervisors of Palestinian Affairs in
the host countries in August 1991 called Arab countries to
abide by their pledges in the treatment of Palestinian refu-
gees in Arab states and reminded with the spirit of Arab
brotherhood to overcome the negativity of the Gulf War.17
Nevertheless, Palestinians in Egypt were punished as a
result of the PLO’s position on Iraq. Shiblak considers two
factors affecting the treatment of Palestinians in Arab coun-
tries.18 Firstly, the commitment of Arab states to Arab
League resolutions varied and was influenced by politics
within these states. Secondly, the treatment of Palestinian
refugees in host countries was not governed by clear guide-
lines or legislation. Stateless Palestinians in  Egypt were
victimized by such politics.19 Despite the fact that Palestini-
ans have a home,  they remain stateless  until there is a
Palestinian state. Palestinians in Egypt who are holders of
Egyptian travel documents have had no basic human rights
since 1978. They have no access to free education (except
for children of PLO officers), have no right to work in the
public sector, and their work in the private sector is condi-
tional on regulations set for foreigners. Palestinians have no
right to free university education. Their rights to ownership
are quite limited, except for those fields which come under
the investment law.
Validity of Egyptian Travel Documents
Since 1960, Egypt has been issuing the “Egyptian Travel
Document for Palestinian Refugees,” valid for five years. Its
validity, however, is contingent on the renewal of one’s
residence permit. Renewal requirements vary according to
the year of arrival. The Department of Passports and Nation-
ality categorizes the residence renewal period as follows, by
arrival year:20
• before 1948, renewable every five years, or every ten years
with proof of ten-year continuous residence in Egypt;
• 1948, every five years;21
• 1956, every three years;
• 1967, every three years;
• after 1967, every three years, or may vary according to the
conditions of entry into Egypt.
Palestinian Refugees of Egypt
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Finding a Residence Permit Guarantor
Despite Palestinians in Egypt being refugees or displaced
persons and unable to go back to Palestine due to its occu-
pation, being granted residence permits is conditional on
providing a reason for remaining in Egypt. This could be for
education, licensed work, marriage to an Egyptian, or busi-
ness partnership with an Egyptian. As the following inter-
view shows, an official document, proving that the applicant
lives in Egypt for one of these reasons, must be provided.
I sometimes rush around for days to finish paperwork to renew
my children’s and husband’s residence permits. I am in charge
of all the paperwork for travel documents and schools. All have
three-year residence permits. The children get their residence
permits based on the fact that I am Egyptian and my husband
gets his based on a letter from a factory claiming that he works
there and a letter from the Labour Union. Although he does not
work in a factory, the owner was kind enough to give him this
letter on a yearly basis. The renewal of the residencies cost us LE
500 for seven persons – my husband and my six children. I
sometimes run out of money and borrow from my family to
help pay the fees (P22, Faisal, Cairo, June 15, 2002).22
Those working with or those who had worked with the
Egyptian government, the Office of the Governor of Gaza,
or the PLO have the fewest problems renewing residence
permits. A letter from their workplace proving employment
or retirement facilitates renewal. The majority of Palestini-
ans in Egypt who work in the informal sector without work
permits or stable jobs, however, face the greatest obstacles.
Many have found their own ways of overcoming this problem.
Getting a work permit as a taxi driver is much easier than getting
it as an owner of an electrical repair workshop. That would
require providing proof of commercial registration, insurance
and licences for the shop. All this requires money and permits
that I can’t provide. If an inspector comes to the workshop, I
would need to give him five to 10 pounds so that he won’t report
that the workshop is not registered (8/11, Shubra Al-Khaima,
Cairo, June 12, 2002).
When performing illegal or unlicensed work, Palestini-
ans often present a taxi driver’s licence to the authorities
when they renew their residence permits. These licences are
not difficult to obtain. Alternately, an agricultural labour
licence, which can be obtained with a letter from the labour
union, may also be used for proof of being an unskilled
labourer.
An agricultural labour permit usually costs one or two pounds.
For a permit as a shop owner, I may need to pay 16 pounds a
month as insurance. In the past, I was able to get an agricultural
labour permit easily but now it is not as easy. The administra-
tion at the Mogamma (a government complex that includes all
bureaucratic departments) in Cairo may ask to look at my
hands and see that I don’t have the hands of a farmer (7/37,
Faqous, Sharqieh, July 14, 2002).
A major concern of interviewees was the  renewal of
residence permits for young men. They can be deported at
age 18 if they had to drop out of school because of inability to
pay private school fees—since, as foreigners, they have no
right to free school education, or at age 21 if they graduate
from university and cannot find licensed work. Many in such
positions are forced to live illegally until they can provide the
authorities with an official reason for their stay.
My son became an illegal resident when he turned 21. The
officer at the Mogamma – a complex that includes all bureau-
cratic departments – in Cairo told me that he would soon be
deported. My son had never gone to school because he had a
fever when he was a baby that affected his brain. His sisters and
I get our residencies renewed based their father’s pension as a
former PLO fighter (P24, Wailey, June 24, 2002).
If no justification for one’s stay in the country can be
provided, a bank statement showing a balance of at least LE
20,000 may be accepted by the Mogamma.
We had to deposit 20,000 pounds to get a residence permit for
my eldest son when he turned 21. Now, we have to deposit
another 20,000 for our younger son (AP2, Hilmiat Al-Zaytoun,
Cairo, August 5, 2002).
Stateless Palestinians living in Egypt without legal resi-
dence or renewed travel documents not only risk illegal stay
for themselves but also for their children. For example,
Rania’s residence permit depends on her Egyptian mother
as a guarantor. Despite the fact that her husband works in
a business, he has no work or residence permit.
My second daughter is married to a Gazan who runs a business
for a Saudi. He has neither a residence permit nor a work
permit. He put 20,000 in the bank to get a residence permit but
it has not been issued (P22, Faisal – Cairo, June 15, 2002).
For many young Palestinian men and women, early
marriage to Egyptian partners is a means of obtaining a
guarantor to legalize one’s stay in Egypt.
My son will soon turn 21. His father and I are thinking of getting
him married soon. We have asked for the hand of my niece, an
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Egyptian, but her parents refused because my son is Palestinian.
We have ensured the situation of our two daughters who are
both engaged to Egyptians. Eventually they will get Egyptian
nationality (8/3, Abu Zaabal- Qaliubieh, June 30, 2002).
While an Egyptian man can naturalize his Palestinian
wife and her children since the nationality law stipulates
that the wives and children of Egyptian men are automat-
ically granted  Egyptians nationality,  women  married to
Palestinian men are not able to do the same.23 A committee
was formed in September 2003, in a response to President
Mubarak’s call, to amend the  law and enable Egyptian
women to naturalize their children; the law however, ex-
cluded Egyptian women married to Palestinian men from
passing on their nationality to their children.24
Moreover, fees for renewing the residency for poor Pal-
estinian families without regular income are a major con-
cern. In case of any delay in renewing the residence permit,
they may be threatened with fines.
I was once late in renewing permits for me and my six children
because I did not have enough money. They wanted to fine me
LE 315. I submitted an appeal and was exempted from the fine.
They renewed the residencies as usual (7/30, Belbeis- Qaliubieh,
July 2002).
Statelessness is a critical obstacle to the enjoyment of
basic rights. Palestinians who have Egyptian travel docu-
ments are de facto stateless. The travel document does not
designate nationality; it is merely a laissez-passer.
Ahmed: “We have not renewed our residence permits for more
than 14 years. Our mother is Jordanian – (Jordanian women
cannot pass on their nationality to their children) and our
father, who looked after these issues, used to travel with the PLO
army. It was only when my father was put in prison that we
realised that we should renew our travel documents and had to
pay a penalty of 2,000 pounds.”
Um Ahmed: “Seeing how difficult it was to renew the travel
documents, I went with my daughter to the ‘republican palace’
and we pleaded with the head of the ‘republican guard’ to help.
He promised to help and said there was no need to meet with
the president. He told us to go to the Zaqaziq Passport Section.
When I sent my son, they renewed his travel document but
refused to renew the documents of his five brothers. If we aren’t
soon able to obtain a travel document for my daughter, she may
lose her fiancé. She needs legal status to register her marriage.”
Ahmed: “I am rarely worried about not having a residence
permit. When I am stopped, I show them my unrenewed docu-
ment. I know they can’t read and don’t understand the travel
document details” (7/25,  Abu Hammad, Sharqieh, July 10,
2002).
Difficulties Faced Using an Egyptian Travel
Document
Article 3 of the Arab League’s Casablanca Protocol states,
“When their interests so require, Palestinians presently re-
siding in the territory of (…) shall have the right to leave the
territory of this state and return to it.” However, the situ-
ation for those leaving the country differs from the protocol
statement. Palestinians who leave Egypt can ensure their
return in two ways. They must either return every six
months or provide papers proving  they are working or
documents stating educational enrolment abroad. In this
case, a one-year return visa may be granted. Any delay in
return beyond this date, however, results in denial of entry.
Two of my children have been denied re-entry to Egypt. I have
not seen them since they left. One is a lawyer in Libya and the
other has a photocopy centre. Neither has as work contract in
Libya (7/36, Faqous, Qaliubieh, July 14, 2002).
Due to the limited work opportunities in Egypt, many
Palestinians seek work in Gulf countries, Libya, or else-
where. They may be reluctant to do so, however, because of
the possibility that their return to Egypt may be denied.
I used to go to Libya when the borders were open and travel was
easy. The problem is that I had to come back to Egypt every six
months to keep my Egyptian residence permit. I was unable to
apply for a one year return visa because I never had official
contracts in Libya and was working in various places. In 1995,
I decided to come back after seeing what happened to my
brother when he returned from Yemen. He was detained at the
airport for several days and then deported back to Yemen despite
the fact that he had an Egyptian travel document and regularly
renewed his residence (7/37, Faqous, Qaliubieh, July 14, 2002).
Palestinians returning to Egypt from abroad, particularly
after the 1990–1991 Gulf War, encountered many prob-
lems as a result of the PLO’s stance on the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. Egyptian newspapers published reports on Pales-
tinian students registered  at  Egyptian universities being
prevented from entering Egypt.25 There were also reports of
Palestinians held in airports and then deported to Sudan.26
Many who had Egyptian travel documents and who lived in
Kuwait or elsewhere in the Gulf were denied re-entry to Egypt.
My son, who was studying in Poland, graduated in 1991 and
tried to come back to Egypt. In the airport, he was prevented
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from entering. That was a result of the Palestinian position on
the Gulf war. He was forced to go to Sudan and then to Yemen,
where he is now (P16, Ain Shams, Cairo, June 8, 2002).
After the 1990–1991 Gulf War, Gulf countries also re-
stricted the entry of Palestinians holding Egyptian travel
documents. Um Mohamad’s family is one example.
My son is working in the Emirates [where he was working
before the Gulf War]. He has an Egyptian travel document.
Surprisingly, three years ago, when trying to join her husband,
his wife and her children [who are also holders of the Egyptian
travel documents] were sent back [to Egypt] from Dubai air-
port, she was refused permission to enter the country despite
the valid visa in her passport. She came back and has been living
with us for the last three years and her husband comes to Egypt
every six months to renew his residence and see her (AP2,
Hilmiat Al-Zaytoun, Cairo, August 15, 2002).
Further problems arose for Palestinians when Libyan
President Muammar Qadhafi in 1995 ordered all Palestini-
ans residing  in Libya to go to Palestine as a  means of
pressuring Israel to accept all Palestinian refugees returning
to their properties after the Palestinian Authority was es-
tablished. This was intended to put pressure on Israel to
repatriate them. As a result, some Palestinians trying to get
to Palestine via Egypt were stranded for two years on the
Egyptian-Libyan borders at Salloum Camp.
My brother used to live in Libya. He was among those stranded
at the border. For nine months he remained in the camp but
he  managed to  get  smuggled back  into Libya. He  worked
illegally as a teacher in a private school and his salary was given
to him as an allowance [per hour worked] but not as a salary.
He then managed to find a way to get smuggled into Egypt.
Today, he has a bakery registered in his wife’s name and lives
illegally in Egypt (7/27, location held for security reasons,July
10, 2002).
Detaining Palestinians at the border is a common occur-
rence, particularly for those who are stateless and have only
the Egyptian travel document. One example is Abu Saqer,
born in Cairo in  1976  and  carrying an  Egyptian  travel
document,  who had  been living in  Moscow. When  his
Russian residence permit expired, he decided to go to Egypt
to see his family and then reapply to return to Moscow. On
arrival at Cairo airport in August 2001, he was denied entry
and was returned to Moscow. In turn, the authorities in
Moscow prevented him from entering Russia because of his
expired residence permit. He was stranded at the Moscow
airport for at least fourteen months.27 (Al-Hayat, Raed
Jaber, November 9, 2002). Eventually, he was granted asy-
lum in Sweden.28
Detention of Stateless Palestinians in Egypt
As has been described, being stateless and only holding an
Egyptian travel document is problematic for many reasons
and stateless Palestinians may be detained for indeterminate
periods of time.
My son has a category H travel document. He is able to renew
his residence with his Egyptian wife as a guarantor. Last year,
he went with his friends to summer camp. His friends were
calling my son, ‘Pasha, Pasha!’ [a title given to a high ranking
officer at the military]. An officer who was passing by overheard
them and asked my son to show his ID. As he did not have his
travel document with him, he was accused of forging the iden-
tity of an officer (since he was called by his friends as Pasha) and
he was put in prison for 11 months. (7/29, Abu Kbir, Sharqieh,
July 2002).
When arrested, Palestinians may be sentenced or de-
ported, regardless of the grounds for arrest. In some cases,
state security officials require the family of the person ar-
rested to apply for visas to countries that may accept him
or her.
Finding a Way Out
With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the
West Bank and Gaza in 1993, many Palestinians applied to
Palestinian embassies in various countries to return.29 Re-
turn to Gaza and the West Bank was seen as a way of escaping
the humiliating illegal status many of them endured in exile.
At the discretion of Israeli authorities, some were permitted
to return. Palestinians granted permission to return from
Egypt were given Palestinian identity cards on arrival in
Gaza and were issued Palestinian travel documents that are
renewable every three years. Palestinian women whose par-
ents still lived in Gaza were able to apply for their children
and husbands to join them through the family reunification
program.30 Other Palestinians were able to go to Gaza by
applying for  a visiting permit, or tasrieh zyara, through
families living in Palestine. The permit is usually valid for three
months and is issued by the Israeli authorities, who continue
to control the borders of Palestinian Authority areas.
My wife and children in Palestine got Palestinian travel docu-
ments. It was easy because my wife has an ID and applied for us
under the family reunification programme. My papers for the
Palestinian travel document were halted as a result of the Inti-
fada. However, I know many people who left here and are now
there [Gaza] with no IDs or any legal papers and have over-
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stayed the time permitted…I wonder how they live there. I
personally want to go live and work there. But I do not want to
go unless all my papers are processed. I have even applied to the
police force in Gaza. I used to be an officer in the PLO Liberation
Army...Taking the [Palestinian] ID resulted in losing my three-
year residence permit in Egypt and now I have only a one-year
residence (P5, Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, May 18, 2002).
Many of those who returned to Gaza from Egypt had
been part of the PLO. When interviewed, many Palestinian
families in Dar Al-Salam and Wailey (in Cairo) referred to
family members and acquaintances who had left Egypt for
Palestine. Some of those who left kept their houses in Cairo.
Others moved everything to Gaza. However, not everyone
was lucky enough to be allowed to enter Gaza and they
expressed their dismay, wondering when their troubles in
exile would end.
As far as I know, those who used to work for the PLO were the
ones able to apply for a Palestinian ID. I would love to have any
passport other  than  this  [Egyptian]  travel  document.  Even
when I ask to marry a woman, I am refused because the parents
do not want to see their grandchildren suffer as I suffer (8/2,
Ishbin Al-Qanater, Qaliubieh, July 4 2002).
The Palestinian passport (laissez-passer) issued by the
Palestinian Authority to Palestinian  Arabs  living  in the
West Bank and Gaza is recognized by more than eighty
states.31 In spite of this, it is not recognized as proof of
citizenship and most countries require visas. These can be
difficult to obtain because of lack of mobility between
Palestinian  cities and into Jerusalem. Permits  may be
obtained from Israel to travel to an embassy or consulate
in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv and these permits are not always
granted by the Israeli authorities. However, the Palestin-
ian passport has certainly helped many to travel outside
Palestine. Palestinians from the West Bank must have
both the Palestinian document and a valid Jordanian
passport. It is also problematic for Palestinians who went
back to Egypt because it rendered them de facto and de jure
foreigners.
I hold the Palestinian travel document since I was given a
Palestinian ID. I thought it would be better to have a Palestinian
travel document. It turned out to be more difficult. Life in Egypt
became more expensive for us. With the Egyptian travel docu-
ment, we had some privileges, especially since I am a former Ain
Jalout officer. My children were able to go to public schools. But
now we are considered foreigners (P11 Ain Shams, Cairo, May
28, 2002).
Regardless of the duration of their stay in Egypt and
whether or not they once held an Egyptian travel document,
Palestinians with Palestinian travel documents are required
by Egypt to apply for residence permits as foreigners. The
“privileges” they used to have in Egypt have been lost.
My father, who now works with the PA, issued us all Palestinian
IDs, but we kept our Egyptian travel documents. Since we came
back from Palestine, the governor of Gaza has not agreed to
renew our residence permits using the Egyptian travel docu-
ment. They require us to get a Palestinian travel document on
which basis the residence will be given since we now have
Palestinian IDs (7/46, Menya Al-Qameh, Qaliubieh, July 11,
2002).
Further Difficulties for Stateless Palestinians
Many who spoke to us said that young Palestinians who had
problems renewing their residence permits at age 21 and
who had problems in finding employment were more likely
to try to leave for Gaza. Many young Palestinian men in
Egypt have applied to join the Palestinian Authority (PA) in
Gaza in the hopes of earning a regular income and regular-
izing their legal status. Those who were not able to join the
PA still tried to move to Gaza. Some applied for a visitor’s
permit through family in Gaza or the West Bank. Once they
arrived  in Gaza, some Palestinians  would overstay their
permits. Leaving Gaza would then be difficult because they
could be penalized or jailed by the Israeli authorities. In
many cases, returning to Egypt became impossible since
their residence permits for Egypt would have expired after
six months.  During interviews,  many of the Palestinian
women who married in Gaza told us that they had sub-
sequently lost their legal status in Egypt. Today, many live
illegally in Gaza as stateless persons. The outbreak of the
Intifada in 2000 further delayed the processing of applica-
tions for IDs for the family reunification program.
I know many people who left here and now live there [Gaza] with
no IDs or legalpapers and who have exceeded their stay…I wonder
how are they living there (P5, Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, May 18, 2002).
For many, living illegally in Palestine has been the only
solution. For some, it offers hope of being at “home with
the family.”
My son was living in Libya when the authorities confiscated his
house and asked him and his family to leave in 1997. Through
his cousins, he was able to get a permit to visit Gaza. He went
to live there illegally with no papers. He obviously lost his
residence permit in Egypt when he was in Libya and was then
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deported from Libya. He was given a visit permit for Gaza and
this has also expired.... At least he is living with his family in the
homeland “Palestine” (AP3, Alexandria, August 2002).
Assistance and Protection under International
Refugee Law
Relief and assistance are urgent needs for refugees who have
left their properties and homes in search of asylum. How-
ever, protection of the refugee’s basic human rights is of the
utmost importance. The degree to which these rights are
respected varies depending on the politics of the state and
the conventions and protocols ratified by the host country.
While agreeing to shelter Palestinian refugees on a tempo-
rary basis, Arab countries have been keen to place responsi-
bility for the Palestinian refugee problem on the
“international community”; calling for UN Resolution 194
(1948) became the means to remind the world of its respon-
sibilities vis-à-vis the refugees. Arab countries have re-
minded the international community of the moral necessity
of keeping the issue on the agenda and have reiterated the
need for implementing international resolutions concern-
ing this group of  refugees. Considering that the  United
Nations adopted Resolution 181 in 1947, which created the
State of Israel and displaced Palestinian refugees from their
homeland, Arab countries have called for the implementa-
tion of other UN and international conventions to protect
the rights of Palestinian refugees and to ensure their return
to their properties in Palestine.
United Nations Resolutions on Protection
As the situation worsened after the adoption of GA Resolu-
tion 181 and more than half a million Palestinians were
forced to leave their homes, the General Assembly estab-
lished the United Nations Mediator for Palestine, which in
June 1948 established a UN Disaster Relief Project
(UNDRP) in an attempt to coordinate aid efforts amongst
local governments and relief organizations and to mediate
and promote a truce. UNDRP had a sixty-day mandate to
coordinate aid to the refugees from governments and non-
governmental organizations. It was succeeded in November
1948 by the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR),
which later became UNRWA.32
According to the terms of reference of GA Resolution 186 of
May 14, 1948, the Mediator was given the task of promoting a
peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine. Addi-
tional tasks included arranging for the operation of common
services necessary for the safety and well being of the population
in Palestine, protection of the Holy places, directives to co-op-
erate with Truce Commission for Palestine, and to invite assis-
tance and cooperation of additional agencies for the promotion
of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine.33
The mediator also dealt with Palestinian refugees and
suggested to Israel that it allow a number of refugees to
return to their homes. In his September 1948 report, Count
Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations emissary to Palestine,
called for the return of Palestinians as a “right”: “From the
start, I held the firm view that, taking into consideration all
circumstances, the right of these refugees to return to their
homes at the earliest practical date should be established.”
Bernadotte recommended that the General Assembly es-
tablish a conciliation commission to supervise a final set-
tlement of the claims of Palestinian refugees. His mediation
efforts ended with his assassination by Jewish terrorists on
September 17, 1948, only one day after he submitted his last
progress report.
United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine (UNCCP)
In view of the mediator’s recommendations, on December
11, 1948, the General Assembly established the United Na-
tions Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) to
“assist the Governments and authorities concerned to
achieve a final settlement of all question outstanding be-
tween them.” The Commission was formed with the adop-
tion of Resolution 194 (III) and replaced the late mediator’s
mandate in resolving all aspects of the conflict by taking on
his previous functions of facilitating a peaceful settlement.
The Commission was also responsible for the direct pro-
tection of refugees’ rights and interests and for imple-
menting the durab le solution of repatr iat ion,
resettlement, and rehabilitation while at the same time
ensuring a peaceful settlement. Paragraph 2 of the resolu-
tion included the following:
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and
live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so
at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should
be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for
loss of or damage to property which, under principles of inter-
national law or in equity, should be made good by the Govern-
ments or authorities responsible;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatria-
tion, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the
refugees and the payment of compensation and to maintain
close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief
for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate
organs and agencies of the United Nations.
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Terry  Rempel argues that the UNCCP was assigned
with a dual mandate: a broad mandate for conciliation of
all outstanding issues between the parties, and a specific
mandate for the protection and promotion of a durable
solution for Palestinian refugees.34 This dual mandate
created a conflict of interest for the commissioner, mak-
ing it difficult if not impossible to protect and promote
the specific rights of refugees. Due to Israel’s opposition
to repatriation, the protection of refugees’ right to return
home became difficult. Attempts at peace demanded a
compromise the conflicting parties were not ready to
make. This placed an insurmountable obstacle in the way
of the Commission’s mandate and hampered any progress
to achieve a framework for a durable solution for Pales-
tinian refugees.
The UNCCP was hard-pressed to provide protection and
facilitate implementation of the durable solution for Pales-
tinian refugees. It established two bodies – the technical
committee and an Economic Survey Mission (ESM) – to
investigate ways of determining refugee choices and im-
proving their immediate situation. By June 1949, the
UNCCP charged the technical committee with the task of
gathering  the  necessary data  for the implementation of
durable solutions set down in Resolution 194 (III) related
to repatriation and payment of compensation. In its report,
the technical committee based its recommendations on the
assumption of resettling large numbers of refugees outside
Israel. The committee also dismissed the idea of deter-
mining individual refugee choices as “premature,”
stressing that repatriation, unlike resettlement, was a
“political decision.”35
Later, in November 1949, the ESM, which was estab-
lished to “facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and eco-
nomic and social rehabilitation of the refugees,” made a
recommendation:
[t]o reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the area
on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time; and
to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance
of peace and stability in the area.
The ESM’s recommendations focused on resettlement
and advocated finding job opportunities for refugees in
host countries.
They [Palestinians] believe, as a matter of right and justice, they
should be permitted to return to their homes, their farms,
…They are encouraged to believe this remedy open to them
because the General Assembly of the United Nations said so in
its resolution of 11 December 1948…
But repatriation of Arab refugees requires political decisions
outside the competence of the Economic Survey Mission.
Why do not the refugees go somewhere else? Why not resettle
them in less congested lands?...In these circumstances, the only
immediate constructive step in sight is to give the refugees an
opportunity to work where they now are.36
The UNCCP failed to achieve its goals. Israel considered
the establishment  of  an Arab-Israeli agreement  to be  a
prerequisite for repatriation. The Arabs, in turn, considered
the right of return as essential for making peace with Israel.
Neither Israel nor the Arab countries neighbouring Israel
wanted to compromise, and the hopes for resolving the
refugee problem diminished.
Under U.S. pressure, Israel finally agreed to repatriate
100,000 refugees but expected Syria and Jordan to settle the
rest. The Commission did not agree to these conditions and
refused to present the offer to the Arabs, who in principle
were opposed to dividing repatriation. However, the
UNCCP did attempt to facilitate the repatriation of refugees
who wanted to return to Israeli-controlled areas. It ap-
proached the government of Israel to secure the return of
the former inhabitants of the no-man’s land in the north
Gaza region, refugees in Egyptian-administered Gaza, and
refugees in the Gaza zone originating from the Beersheba
area. Only small groups were returned, however. Refugees
from Abasan and Akhzah were permitted to return to cul-
tivate land. Others were permitted to return if the family
breadwinner had remained in Israel. In December 1948, a
total of 800 dependents from Lebanon and Jordan rejoined
their families in Israel and 115 came back from Gaza.37
In addition to securing  the return of these refugees,
though few in number, the UNCCP was also successful in
the protection of refugee properties. The commission called
for the annulment of Israel’s 1950 absentees’ property law,
under which refugee property had been expropriated. The
UNCCP also called for the suspension of all measures of
requisition and  occupation of  Arab houses  and for the
unfreezing of Waqf (religious endowment) property.38 In
1950, it established a Refugee Office to determine the own-
ership, interest, and nature of each refugee property. The
office also prepared an initial plan for the individual assess-
ment of refugee properties relying on detailed information
collected from refugees. By 1964, the office had collected
453,000 records amounting to 1,500,000 individual refugee
holdings.39 The UNCCP maintains the most comprehen-
sive records of Palestinian refugee properties. However,
within four years of its formation, the UNCCP devolved
from an agency charged with the “protection of the rights,
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property and interests of the refugees” to little more than a
symbol of UN concern for the unresolved Arab-Israeli
conflict.40
Article 1D 1951 Refugee Convention:
Applicability to Palestinian Refugees
The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1951 Geneva Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees state, “the shared intention
of the Arab and Western states was to deny Palestinians
access to the Convention-based regime so long as the United
Nations continues to assist them in their own region.”41
UNRWA was created to provide assistance for the refugees
based on UN Resolution 302 (IV) of 1949, while UNCCP
had been expected to provide for their protection based on
UN resolution 194 (III). Hence, Palestinian refugees who are
assisted by UNRWA are not included in the 1951 Conven-
tion relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention
establishes specific rights of refugees and prescribes certain
standards for their treatment. As a minimum standard, the
Convention states that refugees in the country of asylum
should receive at least that treatment which is accorded to
aliens in that country.42 Once recognized by the UNHCR,
the refugee should be treated on a par with nationals in the
country of refuge and should be granted basic rights, includ-
ing rights to education, association, wage-earning employ-
ment, and access to the courts.
The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as a person who:
... owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself to the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The Convention contains provisions whereby  certain
persons, otherwise having the characteristics of refugees as
defined in Article 1A, are excluded from UNHCR’s man-
date. One such provision, as stated in Paragraph 1 of Article
1D, applies  to a special  category  of refugees for whom
separate arrangements have been made to afford protection
or assistance.
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations (UN)
other than the UNHCR protection or assistance. When such
protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the
position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance
with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly
of the UN, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the
benefits of this Convention.
In a note on the applicability of Article 1D of the 1951
Convention on Palestinian Refugees, the UNHCR (2002)
said:
Paragraph 1 is in effect an exclusion clause, and this does not
mean that certain groups of Palestinian refugees can never
benefit from the protection of the 1951 Convention. Paragraph
2 of the Article 1D contains an inclusion clause ensuring the
automatic entitlement of such refugees to the protection of the
1951 Convention if, without their position being definitively
settled in accordance with the relevant UN General Assembly
resolutions, protection or assistance from UNRWA has ceased
for any reason. The 1951 Convention hence avoids overlapping
competencies  between UNRWA and UNHCR, but  also,  in
conjunction with UNHCR’s Statute, ensures the continuity of
protection and assistance of Palestinian refugees as necessary.43
Palestinians living in Egypt, who do not receive the relief
and assistance provided by UNRWA, fall, therefore, within
Paragraph 2 of Article 1D and should automatically be
entitled to the benefits of the 1951 Convention and fall
within the mandate of the UNHCR, “providing of course
that Article 1C, 1E and 1F do not apply.”44 However, the
Convention has not been consistently applied to Palestini-
ans outside UNRWA’s mandate. Susan Akram analyzes the
article’s “protection or assistance” and “ipso facto” phrases,
which intended to provide Palestinian refugees with conti-
nuity of protection under various organizations and instru-
ments.45 In a regime of heightened protection, Akram
argues, two agencies have been set up for Palestinian refu-
gees: UNRWA, which was to be the assistance agency, and
the UNCCP, which was to be the protection agency.46 Arti-
cle 1D’s function was to ensure that if for some reason either
of these agencies failed to exercize its role before a final
resolution of the refugee situation, that agency’s function
was to be transferred to the UNHCR and the Refugee
Convention would fully and immediately apply without
preconditions to the Palestinian refugees.
According to Takkenberg, Egypt ratified the Convention
in 1981 but was
reluctant to become bound by the 1951 Convention, apparently
out of a perceived conflict between the status favoured by the
Arab League and that of the Convention, and also because for
many years the PLO had opposed providing individual Pales-
tinian refugees with the status of the 1951 Convention because
this was considered prejudicial to the inalienable rights of the
Palestinian people.
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Hence, despite the fact that since 1981 Palestinians in
Egypt fall under the mandate of the 1951 Convention, they
have been treated according to the Arab League’s special
status designations. In Egyptian administrative offices, for
example, separate sections are responsible for different
groups of refugees; one is for Palestinians refugees and
another is for 1951 Convention refugees.47
Arab countries were instrumental in bringing about the
unique role of the United Nations in relation to Palestinian
refugees. The UN recognizd that it was partially responsible
for creating the refugee situation through General Assem-
bly Resolution 181 which recommended the partition of
Palestine.48 However, Arab states advocated Palestinian ex-
clusion from the 1951 Convention and from UNHCR’s
mandate primarily because they were concerned that, if
included under the UNHCR mandate, Palestinian refugees
“would become submerged [within other categories of
refugees] and would be relegated to a position of minor
importance.49 This concern was based on political rather
than legal considerations. In many Arab League meetings,
governments voiced fears that the Palestinian plight would
not be adequately addressed if UNHCR’s durable solutions
such as resettlement to a third country or settlement in the
first country of asylum were applied.50 The Palestinian refu-
gee problem, they argued, was to be resolved on the basis
of a special formula of repatriation and compensation
rather than the formula commonly accepted for refugees at
the time, which was resettlement in a third country.51
Given that the UNCCP’s ability to offer protection to
Palestinians was weakened by its dual mandate, and be-
cause the 1951 Convention continues in large part not to
be applied to Palestinians, Palestinians have been left with
no agency to protect their legal rights. This has had particu-
larly dire consequences for stateless Palestinians who have
been denied rights in host countries. Due to the fact that
Palestinians who fled to Arab countries were not granted
citizenship and lost their citizenship in Palestine, many
Palestinians are now stateless.52
Statelessness
Two international conventions are relevant to Palestinians
who are stateless refugees and to whom the 1951 Convention
has not been applied – the 1954 Convention relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness. To benefit from these two con-
ventions, “a person must be determined to be stateless, that
is a person who is not considered a national by any state
under the operation of its law.”53
The determination of statelessness involves a mixture of
legal definitions and factual circumstance. A stateless per-
son is defined as a person who is not recognized as a citizen
by the laws of any state, i.e., de jure stateless. This category
includes Palestinians who hold travel documents, such as
Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian travel documents, tempo-
rary Jordanian passports (Gazans and West Bankers) and
those who hold Palestinian passports which are only travel
documents, or laissez-passer.
In addition to the legal implications, statelessness results
from a particular set of historical events and may be per-
petuated by inability to acquire a new nationality, i.e., de
facto stateless. As a product of the British Mandate’s author-
ity, Palestinian citizenship ended along with the mandate
and with the proclamation of the State of Israel. Thus, those
Palestinians who lost their citizenship then and did not or
could not acquire new citizenship fall into this category.
Also included within this group of de facto stateless persons
are those who were born in a country of residence and
denied citizenship and the rights it entails. For instance, this
group includes the children of a mother who holds the
nationality of the host country and whose husband is a
stateless Palestinian. Even if the children were born or lived
most of their lives in their mother’s country, they are de-
prived of citizenship. A large number of those persons are
said to be found in Egypt. Hala Abdel-Qader estimates the
number of Egyptian women married to foreigners to be
286,000.54 According to her unofficial estimates, the
number of stateless children born to these women exceeds
one  million. Despite  the fact that Egypt has signed the
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the
government has refused to ratify the second section of
Article 9 of CEDAW, which stipulates that: “States Parties
shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the
nationality of their children.”55
The two conventions on statelessness relate to Palestini-
ans who are refugees and are stateless but to whom the 1951
Refugee Convention does not apply. The 1954 Stateless
Convention has a clause similar to the 1951 Convention
stipulating it “shall not apply to persons who are at present
receiving help from organs or agencies of the United Na-
tions other than the United High commissioner for Refu-
gees protection or assistance so long as they are receiving
such protection or assistance.”56
The limited applicability of this article to Palestinian
refugees and th e previously mentioned conventions has
excluded Palestinians from enjoying all of their basic hu-
man rights. It is noteworthy that the basic definition of
“stateless persons” is now considered part of international
customary law and is therefore binding even on states that
are not party to one or other of these conventions.57 Not-
withstanding the articles of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which recognises the inherent dignity and
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the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world, Palestinians have been labelled as not
having the “the right to have rights”58 In principle, Palestin-
ian resident non-nationals should acquire vested rights and
should be treated on a par with nationals in host countries.
National Protection
Two main principles have influenced the attitudes of Arab
League member states to vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees. The
first is their support for the Palestinian cause, on which basis
they agreed in the Casablanca Protocol, which Egypt ratified
in 1965, to grant Palestinian refugees residence and the right
to work and travel on the same footing as citizens. The
second principle refers to their vow to preserve Palestinian
identity and maintain the refugee status of Palestinians in
order to hold Israel responsible for the creation of the Pal-
estinian refugee plight. Hence, Palestinians were to be
granted basic rights but not naturalised. One exception is
Jordan where Palestinians were granted citizenship. Small
numbers of Palestinians in Lebanon and Egypt were also
granted citizenship. However, no clear pattern was found to
justify the grounds under which the citizenship was granted.
In Egypt, as of the end of 1970s, Palestinians were treated
as foreigners and were deprived of the basic rights and equal
treatment they had been promised. While Egypt’s political
stance on the Palestinian issue is seen as important and
supportive, in practice no basic rights have been provided
for Palestinians as a result of political events and strained
relations between the Egyptian government and the PLO.
This, in turn, has affected the livelihood of Palestinians in
Egypt.
Ambiguous Legal Status Needs Rectification
Since 1952, the UNCCP has failed to provide Palestinian
refugees with basic international protection. Owing firstly to
the inability of the UNCCP to reconcile the internal contra-
dictions involved in its mandate and due to its inability to
take “political decisions”, refugee protection has been lim-
ited to those issues about which there was the least amount
of disagreement, namely the documentation and evaluation
of refugee properties for payment of compensation.
Although very few Palestinians have been assisted by
UNHCR to date, those who live outside UNRWA’s area of
operations are included in the 1951 Refugee Convention
and should be recognised under the revised interpretation
of the exclusion and inclusion clauses in Article 1D of the
Convention. In addition, Egypt needs to commit itself to
fully respecting the basic human rights of Palestinian refu-
gees in light of the Casablanca Protocol and its commitment
to alleviating the  plight of  Palestinians,  particularly the
Palestinian refugees and displaced persons residing in its
territories.
The ambiguous legal status of Palestinians has affected
their livelihoods in many ways. It has rendered their resi-
dence insecure and in many cases illegal. This has affected
employment and education opportunities, as well as free-
dom of movement and association. As a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several other
covenants on civil and political rights, Egypt should provide
basic rights to Palestinians regardless of political circum-
stances. The deprivation of rights and the unstable legal and
economic conditions of Palestinians in Egypt rendered
them “in limbo”.
Notes
1. “Host countries” are defined as those areas in which UNRWA
operates: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza.
Although Egypt received Palestinians, it does not define itself
as a host country as such due to the fact UNRWA did not
operate within it.
2. Maha Dajani, The Institutionalization of Palestinian Identity in
Egypt, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. 9, monograph 3
(Cairo: AUC Press, 1986), 41.
3. In 1993, new eligibility rules were issued that widened the
categories of Palestinians that could be served by the UN
agency. According to the initial definition, only those in need
of assistance could apply to UNRWA. The reformulation of
the rules in 1993 eliminated the condition of need in order to
allow groups of non-registered Palestinians who left Palestine
in 1948 to apply. This acknowledged the fact that applying for
Palestinian refugee status with UNRWA had certain political
implications for the peace negotiations and right of return.
This wider interpretation, however, does not include Palestin-
ian refugees in Egypt or in other Arab counties. Yet, this may
in the future be used in the permanent status negotiations. See
Lex Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in Interna-
tional Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
4. Nadera Sarraj, et al., Arab Palestinians in Egypt (Cairo: Dar
Al-Mustakbal, 1986).
5. “Population displacement” is defined as the process of collec-
tive dislocation and/or settlement of people away from their
normal habitat by a more powerful force.
6. UNRWA expanded its assistance to “other persons in the area
who are at present displaced and are in serious need of imme-
diate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities” (UNGA
Resolution 2252 (ES-V), July 4, 1967, in Takkenberg, 82).
Hence, although UNRWA expanded its assistance to those
displaced by the 1967 War, it never expanded its working
definition of a Palestine refugee.
7. For more details, see <http://www.mfa.gov.eg/getdoc.
asp?id=131>.
8. This was possible upon request of an entry permit to Egypt;
some restrictions were imposed on mobility between Gaza and
Egypt.
Volume 22 Refuge Number 2
28
9. Abdul Qader Yassin, “Palestinians in Egypt,” Samed El Iqtisadi
[journal; published in Amman, Jordan]18, no. 106 (1996).
10. UNHCR,  “Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to Pales-
tinian Refugees,” International Journal of Refugee Law 14, no.
2–3 (2002): 450–56.
11. See below at page 26 for the text of both Article 1A and 1D of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
12. As noted earlier, in July 1948, the political committee of the
Arab League called for the formation of a civil administrative
government responsible to the Arab League. In September
1949, the Government of All Palestine was declared as the
official government representing Palestinian; see Sarraj et al.
13. Laurie Brand, Palestinians  in the  Arab World (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988), 51.
14. News clipping, Al-Ahram, April 20, 1960.
15. The Arab states that ratified the protocol without reservation
are: Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and North
Yemen. Kuwait and Lebanon ratified the protocol with reser-
vations. Morocco and Saudi Arabia did not ratify the protocol.
Other Arab states were not yet independent.
16. Takkenberg, 147.
17. The Paragraph 7, Resolution 5093, September 12, 1991, reads
as follows:
Having taken notice of the memorandum presented by the
delegation of Palestine, the Conference expresses the hope
that all Arab states, in a spirit of brotherhood and solidarity,
will seek to abide by the Protocol relating to the Treatment
of Palestinians [Casablanca Protocol] in accordance with the
rules and laws in force in each state, and calls upon the Arab
states to overcome the negative impact of the Gulf crisis, as
regards the implementation of this Protocol in respect of
the Palestinian people. [Citation taken from Takkenberg,
149.]
18. Abbas Shiblak, “Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestin-
ian Refugees in Arab Countries,” Journal of Palestine Studies
25, no. 3 (1996): 36–45.
19. A stateless person is someone not considered a national by any
state under the operation of its law, as defined by Article 1 of
the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.
20. A, B, and C permits and travel documents are processed at the
Mogamma, a government complex that includes all bureau-
cratic departments, in Cairo. Category D and H papers are
processed by the Governor of Gaza in Madinet Naser.
21. After the age of 50, one’s residence permit can be renewed free
every five years (P17, Ain Shams, June 8, 2002).
22. After each interview quoted in this paper, the number of the
interview appears in parentheses (in figures or in letters ac-
cording to files of the researcher), together with the district,
the governorate in Egypt, and the date of the interview.
23. Only recently, a few Arab countries started considering chang-
ing the law and permitting women to pass on their nationali-
ties to their spouses and children. By the end of 2003, both
Jordan and Egypt, supported by their first ladies, amended the
laws but very little has been observed at the practical level.
24. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2003/663/eg4.htm>.
25. Al-Sha’b, October 9, 1990.
26. Al-Ahali, Tharwat Shalabi, September 11, 1991.
27. Al-Hayat, Raed Jaber, November 9, 2002.
28. UNHCR Representative, Egypt, personal  communication,
May 29, 2003.
29. According to some, through negotiations it may be possible to
reach an agreement on a quota of 40,000 refugee immigrants
to Israel over a period of five years. In any event, it was agreed
that Israel has the sovereign right to decide who will enter the
territory and who will be barred from entering. See:
<http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/prmepp.html>.
30. Israeli conditions for the right of residence are that the person:
(1) that the person was registered in the Israeli census in the
newly Occupied Territories in 1967, (2) holds an Israeli iden-
tity card, and (3) has been visiting the territories regularly, at
least every  six  years, since  the  census was conducted; see
Hovdenak et al., Constructing Order: Palestinian Adaptations
to Refugee Life (Oslo: Fafo, 1997), 67. The family reunification
program was carried out through those who had Israeli iden-
tity cards which later became Palestinian IDs (and were ap-
proved by the Israeli authorities).
31. Abbas Shiblak, “The League of Arab States and Palestinian
Refugees’ Residency Rights,” Shaml Monograph Sereies
(Ramalla: 1998).
32. UNRWA, UNRWA Past, Present and Future: A Briefing Docu-
ment (Vienna: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1986).
33. Terry Rempel, “The United Nations Conciliation Commis-
sion for Palestine, Protection, and a Durable Solution for
Palestinian Refugees,” Information and Discussion Brief, issue
no. 5 (Bethlehem: Badil, 2000).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Takkenberg, 25–26.
37. Rempel.
38. Ibid.
39. The office estimated that a total of 17,167 square kilometres
out of 26,320 square kilometres (the total area of pre-1948
Palestine) were determined to be refugee lands; see Salman
Abu Sitta, “The Right of Return: Sacred, Legal and Possible,”
in Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return, ed. Naseer Aruri
(Pluto Press, 2001), 195–207.
40. Susan Akram, “Temporary Protection and Its Applicability to
the Palestinian Refugee Case,” Information and Discussion
Brief, issue no. 4 ( Bethlehem: Badil, 2000).
41. James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto and
Vancouver: Butterworths, 1991), cited in Takkenberg, 90.
42. Ibid.
43. A similar provision to Article 1D of the 1951 Convention is
continued in UNHCR’s Statute, paragraph  7(c) of which
stipulated that the competence of the High Commissioner
shall not extend to a person who “continues to receive from
other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or
assistance.”
Palestinian Refugees of Egypt
29
44. The fact that such a person falls within paragraph 2 of Article
1D does not necessarily mean that he or she cannot be returned
to UNRWA’s area of operations, in which case, once returned,
the person would fall within paragraph 1 of Article 1D and
thereby cease to benefit from the 1951 Convention (Note on
Applicability 2002).
45. Susan Akram, “Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee Rights un-
der International Law and a Framework for Durable Solu-
tions,” in Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return, ed. Naseer
Aruri (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 165–94.
46. Ibid.
47. Takkenberg, 125.
48. Akram, 2001, 173.
49. Takkenberg, 66.
50. The review of the preparatory work has also revealed that the
international community did not decide to exclude Palestinian
refugees from the general legal regime for the protection of
refugees. Although the Arab states did not consider themselves
primarily responsible for financing the relief effort, they were
concerned that assistance or protection be extended to the
Palestinian refugees irrespective of whether relief by the
United Nations would continue to be provided. They, there-
fore, made it clear that the provision, included upon their
request in the draft convention, was only to exclude Palestin-
ian refugees temporarily See Takkenberg, 66.
51. Akram, 2001, 173.
52. Until a Palestinian state is established and Palestinian pass-
ports of that state can be issued for Palestinians in the diaspora,
they will remain stateless.
53. Article 1 of the 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons.
54. Hala Abdel-Qader, “Statelessness in Egypt,” paper presented
at the regional workshop Statelessness in Arab World, Ayia
Napa, Cyprus (Ramalla: Shaml, 2001).
55. In the first week of May 2001, independent MP and civil society
activist, Fayza Al Tahnawi, presented a draft law to the People’s
Assembly calling for the modification of Article 2 of the Na-
tionality Law (26/1975), which stipulates that only Egyptian
men can pass on their nationality to their children. According
to the same article, women have the same right only if the
father is unknown or stateless. See: Hossam Bahgat, “Living
on the Margins: A Parliamentary Proposal Brings the Long-
Ignored Issue of Citizenship to the Fore,” Cairo Times, 10–16
May, 2002.
56. “Unfortunately, adherence to the 1954 Convention is far more
limited than in respect of the 1951 Convention,” according to
Takkenberg. As at September 29, 1994, based on information
provided by the Centre for Documentation on Refugees, only
three  member states of the  Arab League  are  party to the
Convention: Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. See Takkenberg, 186.
57. Akram, 2000.
58. Takkenberg, 195.
Oroub El-Abed is an independent researcher working on
Palestinian refugee issues and development related themes.
She has an M.Sc. in Development Studies from the School of
Oriental and African Studies of the University of London.
She has conducted several research projects on Palestinian
refugees in Egypt and in Jordan. She has a forthcoming book
on her complete research on Palestinians in Egypt. She has
worked with the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the
American University in Cairo, the Shaml Centre in
Ramalla, the French research centre IFPO, and the Depart-
ment of Palestinian Affairs of the Jordanian government.
Oroub El-Abed is currently based in Amman, Jordan, and
doing consultancies on several development issues related to
Palestinian refugees and Iraqis. This paper is adapted from
the manuscript for a book “Unprotected in Egypt, Living and
Coping as a Palestinian,” 2004.
Volume 22 Refuge Number 2
30
